Report Number: 05-0000218
Report Date: 05/27/2005

Event Description

At approximately 05:00 hours, May 10, 2005, we were dispatched to a restaurant on fire. The weather was cool and clear. All personnel were entering the final hour of their 24 hour shift. All of the responding company's work in an extremely busy part of town in a large city in (state name deleted). The responding companies consisted of 2-District Chiefs, 4-Engine Companies, 2-Ladder Companies, 1-Basic Life Support Ambulance, 1-Paramedic Squad Unit and 1-Safety Officer. The first arriving Engine Co. arrived on scene reporting fire showing from the roof of a one-story restaurant in a strip shopping center. The Engine Co. stated they were making a fast attack on the fire. The District Chief arrived on scene at the same time and assumed command of the fire. Two other Engine Co.'s and two Ladder Co.'s arrived on location less than one minute later. The Incident Commander assigned a Rapid Intervention Team and instructed another Engine Co. to lay a supply line to the attack engine. The IC then ordered the second Engine Co. to assist the first arriving Engine Co. with attacking the fire. The IC instructed the first Ladder Co. to begin forcible entry operations and check for possible extension in the adjoining businesses. I was assigned to the second arriving Ladder Co. As we arrived on scene, I could see the fire burning along the roof line on the front of the building. A large sign with the name of the business was also on fire. There appeared to be some burning debris on the ground beneath the sign and near the building. My first impression of the fire was nothing more than an electrical short which caused the sign to catch fire and some of the debris had fallen to the ground. I reported to the IC that my Company was on location and ready for assignment. The IC ordered my crew to assist with forcible entry and to begin Primary Search. I acknowledged the orders and we proceeded to maneuver the Ladder Truck into position at the front of the building. As we approached the front of the building, I continued to assess the situation. Suddenly, the large sign fell from the facade landing on top of two firefighters. The sign was approximately 20'(L) x 5' (H) x 1' (W)) I reported the collapse to the IC along with the fact that a firefighter was trapped beneath the sign. I then informed my crew that there was a collapse and firefighters were trapped. At this time, the Engineer/Operator assigned to the first arriving Engine Co. called for a May-Day. My crew and I ran to the aide of the downed firefighters. Several crews converged on the collapse zone at the same time. I could only see one firefighter at this time and he was trapped under the middle portion of the sign. I took a position at the head of the injured firefighter. (NOTE: This firefighter was the Acting Captain during this shift.) I could clearly see his face through his facepiece. He appeared to be unconscious and did not respond when I asked if he could hear me. At this moment, there were probably a dozen or more firefighters at the site of the collapse, most of whom were assisting in lifting the sign enough to allow the others to pull the firefighter free from his entrapment. Once we pulled him clear of the collapse zone, I again tried to determine his level of consciousness while the others began assessing his injuries. It was difficult to tell if he was breathing at first, due to all of his Turnout Gear. Again, he did not respond to my voice. About 30 seconds after we removed him from the collapse zone, the firefighter opened his eyes and slowly began answering questions appropriately. The second firefighter involved in the collapse was trapped, momentarily, from the waist down. (NOTE: This firefighter was a Temporary Fill-In Firefighter normally assigned to another station in another district.) He was able to extricate himself and immediately went to the aide of the other firefighter. He attempted to lift the large sign off of the firefighter but was unable to move it. Not realizing how badly he was injured and working off of adrenalin, he retrieved an attack line and started to spray water on the burning building to protect the other firefighters from further collapse. Once both firefighters were out of harm's way, they were immobilized using spine boards and transported to an area trauma center for further assessment of their injuries. Both were treated and released from the hospital later that same morning. One remains off-duty due to his injuries one week after the incident. In summary: The first arriving Engine Co. consisted of the following personnel: (1) Acting Captain - This individual was promoted to Engineer/Operator (E/O) less than one year ago. He transferred to this station approximately two weeks prior to this fire and is assigned as an E/O on one of the ambulances assigned to the station. This is the firefighter that was unconscious and trapped under the middle of the sign. (2) Roving Engineer/Operator - The individual driving the apparatus was recently promoted to Engineer/Operator and is currently awaiting permanent assignment to an ambulance. Newly promoted personnel in our department are subject to working in a “Roving” status for many months before a permanent assignment is given. This puts them in the uncomfortable an unsafe position of possibly working at a different fire station, with different crews and in different parts of town from one day to the next. (3) Firefighter #1 - This firefighter is normally assigned to another station in another district. He is a 25 year veteran firefighter. He and another firefighter were attempting to raise a 24' extension ladder when the collapse occurred. (4) Firefighter #2 - This firefighter is a Rookie Firefighter. He was recently transferred to this station. At the moment of collapse, all departmental SOP/SOG's were being enforced and followed. I believe there are several key factors which contributed to this near fatal incident. NOTE: There were multiple points of origin at this fire. It is currently under investigation. (1) Obviously, this crew was not familiar with one another. This particular station and shift does not have a regularly assigned Captain, Engineer/Operator or normal compliment of assigned firefighters. The officer is either an Engineer/Operator riding in the Captains position or a Fill-In/Overtime Captain. This is a growing problem/concern in our fire department. One point of concern is the fact that our command staff will fill support divisions such as Dispatch, the training academy and command staff positions, using suppression personnel, before they will fill open suppression positions in the fire stations. This causes a large percentage of fire crews to work with firefighters who are not familiar with one another. (2) Our fire department, like many others, has a chronic shortage of EMS personnel. The command staff has no choice but to require all new hires to become paramedics. Paramedic shortages have always been a problem for our department but it hasn’t been a real concern to the men and women in suppression until recent times. The concern lies in the fact that a large percentage of our members are eligible for retirement and the men and women promoting into the vacated suppression positions have been lost in the EMS Division for decades. It’s not uncommon for our members to graduate from the training academy, promote to the rank of Captain or above and never fight a fire at any time in between. Therefore, in this case, minimal fireground experience could also be considered. While all of the firefighters on this Engine Co. are viewed as "Good Firemen," only one could be considered a veteran. (3) Situational awareness and decision-making often go hand-in-hand. Learning how to fight fires correctly takes a long time. It’s not something that most people can simply put on Turnout Gear and figure out what to do. One must learn how to assess an emergency, decide how to deal with the emergency and use the resources available. It’s difficult to make a good decision if you have a limited knowledge of how to deal with the situation facing you. In this case, it would appear that the crew should have considered the possibility of a collapse. But the lack of crew continuity may have been an overriding factor. An officer, or for that matter, any member of any crew, who does not know or have confidence in his/her crew could very easily become overwhelmed with issues as simple as ensuring that the crew hasn’t fragmented and started freelancing. (3) Limited knowledge of the Incident Command System. (See above comments) (4) Teamwork and familiarity of crew members is vital to our safety. The way our shift schedule is designed, we are required to work with firefighters we have never worked with before. Crew continuity is a very important part of safety for firefighters. When continuity is broken, things become very dangerous, very quickly. (5) Our fire department is seriously lacking in the area of training. By this, I mean training in the sense of learning the job. The fire department trains us in basic firefighting strategy and tactics. This training is for entry level firefighting. From the moment we graduate from the training academy, we are at the mercy of our peers and our own willingness to learn the job. This incident was obviously preventable. However, there are many things that we, as firefighters, could be many years in advance of such a situation to prevent such a thing from happening. The Emergency Medical Services has the idea down pat. The EMS Divisions in any given fire department invests tremendous amounts of money and hours of training just to prepare them for their internship. From there, these EMT’s and Paramedics will be assigned to a unit with a Field Training Officer for several months where they go through more evaluation and training. Each one must meet a certain minimum criteria before the division heads will consider turning them loose on their own. On the other hand; a firefighter attends a training academy for a few months. He/she graduates and is assigned to a station. Oftentimes, these Rookies are assigned to an apparatus with a Rookie Captain, a Rookie Engineer and a Rookie riding with him/her on the back of the Engine. That is a nothing short of a disaster waiting to happen.

Lesson Learned

1. Training, teamwork, communication and situational awareness are all critical to a safe and successful outcome in every incident that firefighters respond to. 2. All working fires should be followed up with a post mortem. 3. We must always be aware of the possibility of arson. Firefighters must be aware of the common signs of arson: time of day, type of building, location of the building, condition of the building and multiple points of origin, just to name a few. 4. Many firefighters scoff at the thought of being assigned as the Rapid Intervention Team. This is one of the most important assignments that your crew could ever have. Think about it for a moment. If and when you are called into action, you will be assigned the task of searching for and attempting to save a firefighter. More often than not, that firefighter will be a close personal friend of yours. I have been involved in the deployment of two different RIT's. At one fire, we lost 2 firefighters. However, at the most recent fire, we were able to save 1. 5. Never assume that you are above learning anything.

To view the whole report